The border economy by anonymous
Mexico’s maquiladora industry has
become an increasingly significant com-
ponent of the Mexican economy as well
as an important part of U.S. corporate
strategy in achieving competitively
priced goods in the world marketplace.
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Maquiladoras are largely concentrated
in Mexican cities that border the United
States. Since Texas encompasses about
half the U.S.–Mexico border, maquila-
doras are especially relevant to the
state’s economy.
To assess the maquiladoras’ impor-
tance to the border economy, we must
first understand how maquiladoras
affect Mexico. This article looks at the
maquiladora industry’s performance in
Mexico and then the industry’s signifi-
cance for Texas border cities.
Mexico’s Northern Border
The maquiladora industry has boost-
ed job creation, exports and foreign
exchange in Mexico. During 1983–2000,
annual growth in maquiladora em-
ployment and exports averaged almost
14 percent and 21 percent, respectively.
At about 1.3 million workers, maquila-
dora employment represented 29 per-
cent of Mexico’s manufacturing jobs 
in 2000, up from slightly more than 7
percent in 1983. Further, maquiladora
exports, at $79.4 billion in 2000, made
up almost half Mexico’s total exports
(47.7 percent) and the majority of its
manufacturing exports (54.7 percent).
Maquiladoras are Mexico’s top source 
of foreign exchange, netting almost $18
billion last year. Table 1 summarizes the
maquiladora industry’s key indicators
for 2000.
The maquiladora industry also has
contributed significantly to Mexico’s re-
gional, technological, human capital and
infrastructure development, as illustrat-
ed by what is happening at the border.
Regional Development
In 2000, Mexican border cities rep-
resented 62 percent of overall maquila-
dora employment (nearly 797,000 work-
ers) and 70 percent of production ($50
billion). The two locations with the
highest concentration of maquiladora
investment are Ciudad Juárez (across
from El Paso) and Tijuana (across from
San Diego). Together, these two cities in
2000 represented 34 percent of Mexico’s
total maquiladora employment, with
more than 249,500 workers in Ciudad
Juárez and over 187,300 workers in
Tijuana.
Before the maquiladora program’s
implementation, cities along Mexico’s
northern border had among the highest
unemployment rates in the country,
typically in double digits. Because of the
industry’s settlement in these cities 
and its consistent record of employ-
ment growth, these locations now have
among the nation’s lowest unemploy-
ment rates. In fact, maquiladoras have
become so important to the border that
in Ciudad Juárez, for example, the
majority of all jobs in 2000—60 per-
cent—came from the maquiladora sec-
tor. Moreover, the overwhelming major-
ity of the city’s manufacturing jobs—87
percent—were attributable to maquila-
dora companies last year.
Technology and Human Capital
When Mexico’s maquiladora pro-
gram began in 1965, most companies
were basically assembly operations re-
quiring unskilled labor. The industry
has evolved, and factories now use
more sophisticated production tech-
niques and require more skilled labor.
For example, in 2000, technicians repre-
sented 12 percent of maquiladora em-
ployment, compared with 8.8 percent in
1975. In addition, the skill level of the
maquiladoras’ largest labor component
—direct line workers—has been up-
graded to suit newer technologies.
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Mexico’s maquiladora companies
today boast state-of-the-art production
technology. Research and design cen-
ters are now part of the maquiladora
landscape as well. A key example is the
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Domestic $ 1.8 38.5%
Total $55.3 20.3%
Value added (billions) $17.8 32.4%
Exports (billions) $79.4 24.3%
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas El Paso Branch, with data
from Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e 
Informática; export data are from Banco de México.Delphi Mexico Technical Center in Ciu-
dad Juárez. This center, which until
April 1999 was part of the General
Motors Corp. maquiladora production
infrastructure, is dedicated to the re-
search and design of auto parts used by
the world’s top auto producers. Consid-
ered the most advanced of 31 such 
Delphi centers around the world, it
employs almost 2,000 workers, most 
of whom are engineers. The center
opened in April 1995 and within four
years had doubled capacity.
The technological evolution of the
maquiladora industry would not have
been possible without the required
professional and skilled personnel.
This increasingly skilled workforce
comes, in large part, from the maquila-
doras themselves through training and
development at all levels. Typically,
training includes in-house programs 
as well as visits to the company’s man-
ufacturing facilities outside Mexico.
Maquiladoras also sponsor vocational
programs at local technical centers 
and trade schools to ensure that work-
ers’ skills match those in demand by
the industry.
A recent example of the maquiladora
industry’s efforts at educating its work-
force is the Center for High Technology
Training (Centro de Educación en Alta
Tecnología, or CENALTEC), established
in Ciudad Juárez in March 2000. This
center, created through a collaborative
effort between maquiladora companies
in the area and the state and federal
governments, incorporates state-of-the-
art infrastructure in training highly
skilled technicians in manufacturing
specialties. Companies award scholar-
ships to the center’s two-year training
programs.
Infrastructure Development
Though the maquiladora industry is
growing at more dynamic rates in the
interior of Mexico, the border’s appeal is
still high among new investors, and,
thus, growth at the border has been sus-
tained. For example, border employ-
ment growth averaged 7.8 percent per
year during the 1990s, while the cor-
responding figure for the interior was 
17 percent. However, since the border’s
employment base (nearly 797,000 work-
ers) is higher than the interior’s (488,200
workers), job growth of almost 8 per-
cent on the border is still impressive.
Moreover, during the second half of 
the 1990s, when the entire maquila-
dora industry rebounded as a result of
the peso devaluation, border employ-
ment averaged double-digit growth on
a yearly basis (11.1 percent).
3
One outcome of the border’s dynamic
maquiladora growth has been infra-
structure bottlenecks in the region,
which have been only partly alleviated
by the industry’s movement to the in-
terior. The border’s growth has led to
such problems as insufficient or inade-
quate housing for maquiladora workers.
Maquiladora companies are teaming
with the Mexican government to build
adequate and affordable housing for
workers and to assist them with financ-
ing. Delphi Automotive launched the
first such program in 1997. Other large
maquiladora companies have followed
with similar programs.
Maquiladoras also have partici-
pated in improving the infrastructure
of their border locations. For example,
in Ciudad Juárez, maquiladoras make
annual contributions to the city’s 
budget that are targeted for different
purposes, such as city road improve-
ments.
4 Also, maquiladoras have finan-
cially supported improvements to cer-
tain commercial bridges, which are
critical to their daily production ship-
ments across the border.
5
Texas Border Cities
The Texas border is host to the
majority of the maquiladoras along the
U.S.–Mexico boundary. Table 2 lists the
cities across from Texas with a
maquiladora presence and outlines
their individual participation in the
industry. In 2000, these cities’ com-
bined share of total maquiladora em-
ployment and production equaled 35.4
percent and 40.4 percent, respectively.
Within the border region, their com-
bined share represented the majority—
57.1 percent in employment and 57.5
percent in production. This is equiva-
lent to a maquiladora industry employ-
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Table 2
Maquiladora Industry Along the Texas–Mexico Border, 2000
Ciudad Juárez Ojinaga Ciudad Acuña Piedras Negras Nuevo Laredo Reynosa Río Bravo Matamoros
(El Paso) (Presidio) (Del Rio) (Eagle Pass) (Laredo) (McAllen) (McAllen) (Brownsville)
Plants 308 8 56 38 54 117 13 119
Percent of total 8.6 .2 1.6 1.1 1.5 3.3 .4 3.3
Percent of border 14.3 .4 2.6 1.8 2.5 5.4 .6 5.5
Employment 249,509 967 32,130 14,546 22,603 66,091 3,287 66,023
Percent of total 19.4 .1 2.5 1.1 1.8 5.1 .3 5.1
Percent of border 31.3 .1 4.0 1.8 2.8 8.3 .4 8.3
Raw Material Imports (millions) $12,785 $25 $1,099 $329 $1,253 $3,894 $104 $3,254
Percent of total 23.9 .0 2.1 .6 2.3 7.3 .2 6.1
Percent of border 32.6 .1 2.8 .8 3.2 9.9 .3 8.3
Gross Production (millions) $16,191 $37 $1,386 $468 $1,648 $4,826 $145 $4,065
Percent of total 22.7 .1 1.9 .7 2.3 6.8 .2 5.7
Percent of border 32.4 .1 2.8 .9 3.3 9.7 .3 8.1
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas El Paso Branch, with data from Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática.ing more than 455,000 workers in 713
plants and with a total production value
of nearly $29 billion.
Texas border cities have reaped im-
portant benefits from their maquila-
dora neighbors. Transportation and
customs services have flourished on the
U.S. side of the border because of the
maquiladora industry’s large trade flows
through border ports of entry (Table 3).
These companies typically maintain
distribution facilities and administra-
tive offices on the U.S. side, stimulating
the industrial real estate sector of Texas
border cities. Maquiladoras also create
jobs for the U.S. border in the legal,
accounting and financial professions.
Even the hotel, car rental and restaurant
industries profit from maquiladoras
because corporate personnel and other
maquiladora visitors usually stay and
eat on the U.S. side.
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Beyond the service industry, border
manufacturing is increasingly bene-
fiting from maquiladoras. Industry sup-
pliers have been expanding or relocat-
ing their operations to cities such as El
Paso to be close to their customer bases
across the border. For instance, in 1999,
there were 40 plastic injection molding
companies in El Paso, employing more
than 4,100 workers. These companies
mostly serve the maquiladora industry
in Ciudad Juárez in sectors that range
from automotive and computers to
medical and consumer goods. More-
over, employment in plastics manufac-
turing in El Paso—up 101 percent since
1990—is highly skilled. From 1990
through 1999, for example, this sector’s
hourly compensation was, on average,
nearly 21 percent higher than that of the
apparel sector, El Paso’s largest and
most established manufacturing sector.
The success of plastic injection molding
in the area is also evidenced by the
impressive growth of plastic product
exports through El Paso, which equaled
$806 million in 1999, up more than 700
percent from the 1993 level.
The employment link between
maquiladoras and U.S. border cities is
not exclusive to El Paso. Research has
found a strong positive correlation
between U.S. border city employment
and export (maquiladora) production
in the neighboring Mexican border city.
7
Further, results show that for larger 
border cities, such as El Paso, the
employment effect is strongest in man-
ufacturing, while for smaller border
cities, such as Laredo, the employment
effects are strongest for the transporta-
tion and wholesale trade industries.
Indeed, two of the three other major
border cities in Texas—Brownsville and
McAllen—are home to plastic injec-
tion molding suppliers that cater to 
the maquiladora industry. In addition
to El Paso’s 40 plastic injection mold-
ing companies, Brownsville has 11 and
McAllen has 13.
8 Laredo, which has a
minimal manufacturing presence, is
the exception, with no suppliers in this
category.
9 Chart 1 shows the growth
trend of the rubber and miscellaneous
plastics manufacturing subsector in all
four cities for 1990–99. The only city
that shows a decline is Laredo.
Skilled-Labor Bottlenecks
Keeping El Paso from taking full
advantage of the maquiladora supplier
market is an insufficient pool of skilled
workers. Though plastics manufactur-
ers in El Paso have used in-house train-
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Table 3
U.S.–Mexico Trade by Texas Border Port of Entry, 2000
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
Exports to Mexico Imports from Mexico Total trade
Laredo 39,283.6 45,536.3 84,819.9
El Paso 17,520.4 22,810.6 40,331.0
Hidalgo 6,221.9 6,888.5 13,110.4
Brownsville–Cameron 6,374.1 6,049.5 12,423.6
Eagle Pass 4,283.5 3,041.1 7,324.6
Del Rio 1,156.1 1,282.6 2,438.7
Presidio 112.8 153.0 265.8
Rio Grande City 118.8 116.6 235.4
Progreso 129.0 15.6 144.6
Roma 92.4 16.1 108.5
Fabens .9 .0 .9
Total Texas ports 75,293 85,910 161,203
Total all border ports 95,692 120,409 216,101
Texas share 78.7% 71.3% 74.6%
SOURCES: Texas Center for Border Economic and Enterprise Development,Texas A&M International University, with data from U.S. Department of
Commerce.
Chart 1
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Employment for Major Border MSAs
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NOTE: The rubber and miscellaneous plastics industry in Laredo reached such a small level in 1999 that data for that year were not made available.
SOURCE: Texas Workforce Commission.ing to develop their workers into skilled
technicians, a broader effort is required
to generate a continuous supply of
skilled labor. Recognizing this need, the
city has implemented various programs
to train workers not only in plastic-
injection-molding techniques but also
in metal stamping, tool and die, and
other areas that complement the man-
ufacturing processes of maquiladora
suppliers. El Paso also has received
multiple worker retraining grants as a
result of worker displacements in the
city’s apparel industry (see box titled “El
Paso, NAFTA and Worker Retraining”).
The goal is to transform an unskilled
labor pool into the skilled workers
sought by the industries coming to
28 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas | June 2001
El Paso, NAFTA and Worker Retraining
new jobs—or growth of almost 14 percent
between 1993 and 2000.
1 NAFTA reasonably
could be credited with some of this job growth
in areas servicing the increased trade through
the border resulting from NAFTA.
2 This implies
new jobs in transportation and distribution serv-
ices as well as in professional services such as
legal,accounting,financial and customs broker-
age. Finally, the unemployment rate has been
on a downward trend in El Paso since NAFTA
started, as it has for Texas’ other major border
cities (see chart).
Interestingly, El Paso’s No. 1 position in
NAFTA TAA certifications in the United States
has placed the city in the national spotlight,
attracting funding toward retraining programs
for trade-displaced workers. For example, the
U.S. Department of Labor awarded El Paso,
through the city’s Proactive Reemployment 
Project or PREP, a $45 million grant to retrain
some 4,000 workers, most of them former 
garment industry employees. This grant is 
the largest of its kind ever awarded to a city 
by the Labor Department. In 1998, project
ARRIBA (Advanced Retraining and Redevelop-
ment Initiative in Border Areas) was launched in
El Paso with a state grant of $1 million.ARRIBA
secured additional funding totaling more than
$1.5 million from the governor’s Discretionary
Fund ($600,000), the North American De-
velopment Bank ($450,000), El Paso County
($250,000) and El Paso Empowerment Zone
Corp. ($211,297).
Last year the El Paso Chamber of Com-
merce opened the Center for Worker Prepared-
ness with a $1.4 million grant from the U.S.
Department of Commerce and a $1 million
interest-free loan from the North American
Development Bank. In addition, local educa-
tional and training institutions have received
funding for programs such as the El Paso 
Manufacturing Training Consortium at El Paso
Community College. Thus, if NAFTA is to be
cited as the cause of much worker displace-
ment in El Paso, it also has contributed toward
an improved worker-training infrastructure.
Notes
1 If a broader definition of employment is used,
including jobs outside the Social Security system,
El Paso’s employment gain between 1993 and 2000
was larger, at 40,635 new jobs. See Borderplex 
Economic Outlook: 2000–2002, Border Region
Modeling Project, The University of Texas at El
Paso, November 2000, Business Report SR00-1.
2 El Paso is the second-largest land port at the border
for U.S.–Mexico trade, after Laredo. During 1994–
2000, total U.S.–Mexico trade through El Paso grew
122 percent to $40.3 billion. The trade increase 
was due to both maquiladora-specific and NAFTA-
specific activity.
Between 1994 and 2000,a total of 330,107
U.S. workers were certified to receive benefits
under the NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assis-
tance (TAA) program.This program was created
in 1994 through NAFTA to help workers affect-
ed by increased imports from Mexico and 
Canada or by shifts in U.S. production to those
countries as a result of the agreement. El Paso
has the largest number of workers certified
under this program—13,450 through 2000.
Nearly 8,000 of these workers (more than 59
percent) were displaced from El Paso’s apparel
industry.
While many point to the TAA figures as evi-
dence of NAFTA’s negative impact on El Paso,
NAFTA also has created jobs for the city. Unfor-
tunately, because no accounting system equiv-
alent to the TAA tracks the job-growth side of
the equation, an assessment of NAFTA’s net
impact on El Paso’s employment is not possible.
Since NAFTA’s passage, however, El Paso has
registered a net gain in employment—30,733
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market across the border.
The state’s other border cities face
similar situations. Research on maquila-
dora market opportunities for border
cities in South Texas shows that
maquiladoras are willing to enhance
their base of local suppliers. The com-
panies’ savings in inventory and trans-
portation costs are obvious. However,




El Paso has carved an important
niche in serving the maquiladora
industry, especially in plastic injection
molding. This demonstrates that border
cities such as El Paso—which have tra-
ditionally lacked a sophisticated in-
dustrial base—can nonetheless attract
investments using their formidable ad-
vantage with the lucrative maquiladora
market. The total maquiladora inputs or
components market in Ciudad Juárez
alone was worth nearly $13 billion 
in 2000. The industry’s components
market along the Texas border—from
Juárez to Matamoros—was a massive
$23 billion in 2000, roughly 42 percent
of the maquiladora industry’s total
components market ($55.3 billion).
Maquiladoras import 97 percent of
the components they use. And 80 to 85
percent of these come from the United
States, mostly from states not bordering
Mexico.
11 As more suppliers seek to
move closer to their maquiladora cus-
tomer base, the border stands to bene-
fit. The border’s traditionally high un-
employment rate translates into an
available labor pool in the region.
12
However, this workforce has to be 
transformed into the skilled labor that
high-tech maquiladora suppliers need.
Should this happen, we could see in-
dustrialization of the border at a time
when the rest of the country is de-
industrializing, precisely because of the
lack of available workers.
13
For Texas border cities, the presence
of maquiladoras across the border
translates into more and better-paying
jobs. In short, maquiladoras help the
Texas border region move up the eco-
nomic ladder.
Vargas is a senior economist at the 
El Paso Branch of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 For an overview of the maquiladora industry and its
importance for the U.S. and Mexican economies,
see “The Binational Importance of the Maquiladora
Industry,” Southwest Economy, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas,Issue 6,November/December 1999,
pp. 1–5.
2 Direct labor represented 80.9 percent of total
maquiladora employment in 2000. Although the
majority of these workers (55.2 percent) were
female, this share is down considerably from 78.3
percent in 1975. In fact, in the industry’s top two
locations—Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana—females
make up just under half (49.7 percent) of the direct-
labor workforce, putting them in the minority.
3 Because maquiladora companies have dollar-
denominated budgets but their costs are in pesos,
the overnight impact of any peso devaluation is
essentially a reduction in their peso-based costs.
Maquiladoras have therefore responded to devalu-
ations in Mexico by substantially expanding their
operations.
4 According to the Treasury Department of the city of
Juárez,the voluntary contribution that each maquila-
dora in Juárez gives to the city each year, on a vol-
untary basis, is $15 per employee and is based 
on each company’s employment base at year-end.
Not all maquiladoras contribute, but a majority (54
percent based on employment) do. Last year,
maquiladora contributions to the city of Juárez
equaled $1.6 million.
5 For the improvements to the Bridge of the Americas
between El Paso and Juárez in 1996–98, for ex-
ample, various private-sector entities in Juárez—
including the maquiladora association—contributed
some $7 million.
6 Delphi Automotive,until April 1999 a part of General
Motors Corp., has conducted annual studies since
1996 on the total estimated economic impact on 
El Paso of Delphi’s operations in Ciudad Juárez.
Beyond including elements such as what the com-
pany pays the city in property taxes for distribution
and warehousing facilities, the study also includes
expenditures in El Paso on hotels, restaurants and
rental cars by corporate visitors to Delphi plants. In
June 1999, Delphi’s total (direct and indirect) eco-
nomic impact on El Paso was estimated at above
$285 million.
7 The overall elasticity—or responsiveness—of U.S.
border-city employment with respect to Mexican
export production is between 0.11 and 0.2. In other
words, a 10 percent rise in export manufacturing in
a Mexican border city leads to a 1.1 to 2 percent rise
in employment in the neighboring U.S. border city.
See Gordon H. Hanson, “U.S.–Mexico Integration
and Regional Economies: Evidence of Border-City
Pairs,” forthcoming in Journal of Urban Economics.
8 Brownsville Economic Development Council and
McAllen Economic Development Corp.
9 In 2000, for example, only 2.6 percent of Laredo’s
nonfarm employment—some 1,800 workers—was
working in manufacturing, compared with 15 per-
cent in El Paso, 12 percent in Brownsville and 8
percent in McAllen.
10 See J. Michael Patrick, “Maquiladoras and South
Texas Border Economic Development,” Journal of
Borderlands Studies, Spring 1989, pp. 89–98. The
author suggests that the situation has not changed
much in the ensuing 12 years.
11 A 1988 survey of maquiladora companies in Ciudad
Juárez alone showed suppliers in every U.S. state
except Hawaii, with a large portion in Midwestern
and Northeastern states. See William L. Mitchell 
and Lucinda Vargas, “The Economic Impact of the
Maquiladora Industry in Juárez on El Paso, Texas,
and Other Sections of the United States,” Grupo
Bermúdez Industrial Developers, Ciudad Juárez,
Chihuahua, 1989, photocopy. Current anecdotal
evidence shows that maquiladoras continue to
have close links with suppliers throughout the 
United States.
12 In 2000,the weighted average unemployment rate of
Texas’ four major border cities was more than double
the national and state unemployment averages.
13 ADC Telecommunications offers an example of how
cities like El Paso are developing industrially in
response to the presence of maquiladoras across
the border. The company manufactures telecom-
munications equipment at two plants in Juárez and
one in Delicias, Chihuahua. Late last year, ADC
opened a metal fabrication plant in El Paso to feed
components to its Mexican facilities. ADC also has
a distribution center in Santa Teresa,N.M.,just west
of El Paso.
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